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INTRODUCTION

Angle Vasquez, a devout Muslim, was charged with killing two of his
former coworkers. 2 Both victims were found dead inside a Burger King in
Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, just hours after Vasquez had been fired from his
job there as a cashier.3 At trial, the State sought the death penalty. By
coincidence, Vasquez's trial was scheduled to overlap with the second

1.
2.
3.
4.

See Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. 447, 452-53, 698 S.E.2d 561, 563 (2010).
Id. at 451, 698 S.E.2d at 563.
Id. at 451, 698 S.E.2d at 562-63.
See id. at 451-53, 698 S.E.2d at 563-64.
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anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Although the case had
no connection with the events of 9/11 -aside from an unfortunate trial
schedule-the solicitor argued in the penalty phase of the case that Vasquez
should be sentenced to death because he was a "domestic terrorist" 6 whose
actions had affected his victims' families in the same way as those who lost
relatives on 9/11.7 The jury then voted to recommend a death sentence.8
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court overturned Vasquez's capital
sentence, concluding that the solicitor had "intentionally and unnecessarily
injected religious prejudice" 9 into the sentencing phase of Vasquez's trial by
using comments that "appealed to the jurors' sense of passion and prejudice
involving anti-Muslim sentiment."10 The court's decision reflected an awareness
of an intense cultural bias towards Muslims operating at the time of his trial and
continuing today.II
Although courts have imposed a number of constitutional constraints on the
prosecution's use of overt religious arguments in capital cases, this jurisprudence
has largely failed to recognize that coded religious appeals can have the same
practical effects of improperly inflaming religious biases and generating
emotional responses from jurors. Moreover, the prejudicial impact of coded, and
even explicit, religious arguments must be informed by an understanding of the
broader cultural context that gives religious arguments meaning. This is
particularly true in a state like South Carolina where Christianity is by far the
majority religion, 1 2 and where it has been common to invoke privately held
religious beliefs in order to justify civic actions. This Note argues that courts are
more likely to reach accurate and reliable results in their prejudice analyses when
they consider the potential impact of coded religious appeals (in addition to overt
religious arguments) and give appropriate weight to the cultural context in which
improper religious arguments are made.
Part II of this Note provides a brief background of Vasquez v. Statel3 and
summarizes the South Carolina Supreme Court's analysis in that case. Part III
discusses the constitutional restrictions on improper religious arguments in
capital cases and summarizes South Carolina's approach in evaluating these
arguments. Next, Part IV describes how coded appeals are used to communicate
with juries by activating subconscious prejudice, why they are used, and how the

5. Id. at 453, 698 S.E.2d at 564.
6. Id. at 457, 698 S.E.2d at 565 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. See id. at 457-58, 698 S.E.2d at 565-66.
8. Id. at 453, 698 S.E.2d at 563.
9. Id. at 464, 698 S.E.2d at 569.
10. Id. at 463, 698 S.E.2d at 569.
11. See id. at 456-64, 698 S.E.2d at 565-69.
12. See Frank Newport, Religious Identity: States Differ Widely, GALLUP (Aug. 7, 2009),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122075/Religious-Indentity-States-Differ-Widely.aspx (reporting
results of a nationwide survey of individual religious preference "based on telephone interviews
with 178,543 adults, aged 18 and older").
13. 388 S.C. 447, 698 S.E.2d 561 (2010).
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concept of coded appeals applies in Vasquez. Part V explores the religious
composition of South Carolina, and offers the lens through which coded appeals
in this state should be viewed. Part VI then provides several additional examples
of religious coded appeals that South Carolina courts hear more frequentlythose drawn from the Judeo-Christian ethic. Finally, Part VII concludes that the
court's analysis in Vasquez was correct and argues that the principles on which
the Vasquez court drew should guide future prejudice analyses in capital cases.
II. BACKGROUND

Vasquez was charged and convicted of two counts of murder, four counts of
kidnapping, one count of armed robbery, and one count of criminal conspiracy
for holding up his former coworkers and shooting his former manager and a
coworker on March 26, 2002.14 Earlier that day, Vasquez had been fired from
his job at Burger King after a customer complained that he had used profanity
toward a coworker in front of her and her children.15 Just before closing time at
the restaurant, Vasquez returned with his cousin (who had also previously
worked at the Burger King), pulled out a gun, and ordered two of the four
workers on duty into a freezer. 6 The two workers locked in the freezer were
quickly able to escape and flee the scene.17 One of the escaped workers later
returned with his mother to find that the manager and the fourth coworker had
been shot dead.18 At the scene, police discovered over $700 missing from the
restaurant and found shell casings from a nine-millimeter caliber firearm and
unfired ammunition. 19 Eyewitnesses put Vasquez at the scene, and police later
traced the recovered bullets to a gun owned by Vasquez. 20

14. Id. at 451, 698 S.E.2d at 562-63. After a jury found Vasquez guilty of each count in his
indictment, the trial judge sentenced him to death for the murders, thirty years for the armed
robbery, and five years for criminal conspiracy; subsequently, Vasquez filed a direct appeal, and in
State v. Vasquez, 364 S.C. 293, 613 S.E.2d 359 (2005), the South Carolina Supreme Court issued its
first decision concerning Vasquez's trial, which affirmed his murder conviction and death sentence.
See id. at 303, 613 S.E.2d at 364. Later, Vasquez's petition for post-conviction relief from the
capital sentence was denied by the circuit court, and in Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. 447, 698 S.E.2d
561 (2010), the supreme court again granted his petition for review. Id. at 450, 698 S.E.2d at 562.
15. State v. Vasquez, 364 S.C. at 296, 613 S.E.2d at 360. Apparently, Vasquez had cursed at
his coworker for attempting to feed french fries to a customer's dog. Id.
16. Id. at 297, 613 S.E.2d at 361. Before returning to the Burger King, Vasquez and his
cousin had been at a strip club located near the restaurant. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. at 451, 698 S.E.2d at 563.
20. State v. Vasquez, 364 S.C. at 298, 613 S.E.2d at 361. The police were able to trace the
bullets at the crime scene to Vasquez after the two workers who escaped admitted that they had seen
Vasquez and his cousin rob the store. See id. During a search of Vasquez's home, the police found
the same type of ammunition used in the killings and-after Vasquez's cousin turned over the ninemillimeter pistol he had removed from the house before the search-a ballistic analysis confirmed
the bullets at the crime scene had been fired from Vasquez's nine-millimeter. See id.
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Vasquez's Muslim faith was freely acknowledged throughout the trial. As
early as voir dire, this fact was discussed with potential jurors as Vasquez's
defense attorneys attempted to screen out anyone who would be biased against
Muslims.21 Additionally, throughout the proceedings Vasquez wore a kufi, "a
traditional Muslim headdress."22
During the penalty phase mitigation
presentation after he was convicted of murder, Vasquez offered the testimony of
Rasheed Kaleem Solom Mohammed, the imam for all incarcerated Muslims in
South Carolina, who testified at length about Islam and the differences among
various groups of Muslims. 2 3 Mohammed noted that Vasquez is a Sunni
Muslim, which he described as a "humble" and "peaceful" group.24
Additionally, Mohammed testified that he had such confidence in the sincerity of
Vasquez's faith and in his depth of knowledge of Islam that he appointed
Vasquez as the imam to the J. Reuben Long Correctional Facility to teach and
serve other Muslim inmates.25 Finally, Vasquez himself offered a statement to
the jury, denying his guilt26 and chronicling his troubled childhood-he had run
away from home at age nine to escape his father's physical abuse, later went to
live with his mother, and eventually became involved in selling drugs. 27
Vasquez attempted to neutralize the solicitor's reference to 9/11 and the
characterization of him as a terrorist by explaining that Islam teaches "peace,
unity and the fear of the law," 28 and by arguing that the State's ignorance of
Islam should not be used to prejudice the jury's view of him.29
The solicitor did not explicitly comment on Vasquez's Muslim faith;
however, during his opening statement in the sentencing phase, he twice referred
to Vasquez as a "domestic terrorist." 30 Also, during his closing argument the
solicitor gave a lengthy narrative about 9/11, which ended with a comparison of
the life-changing impact 9/11 had on its victims' families and the impact that the
two murders at issue had on those victims' families:
It was in September. It was right before the 11th. I was watching a
news show and former New York mayor, Rudy Giuliani, was being
interviewed and they were talking to him about-9/11 was coming up,

21. Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. at 461, 698 S.E.2d at 568.
22. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. See Record on Appeal at 2248-60, Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. 447, 698 S.E.2d 561
(2010) (No. 26852). Mohammed explained that an imam is "a teacher of Islam," id. at 2248, and
that his role involves teaching Arabic to "the brothers" so that they can read the Koran. Id. at 224849.
24. Id. at 2252-53.
25. See id. at 2250-51.
26. Id. at 2416.
27. Id. at 2405-08.
28. Id. at 2415.
29. See id.
at 2415-16.
30. Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. 447, 457, 698 S.E.2d 561, 565-66 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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the second anniversary of 9/11 was coming up-and they're talking to
him about his experiences .... [H]e talked about so many of his friends,
personal friends and acquaintances and co-workers with the City of New
York that were killed in the attack .... and he concluded his discussion
and his interview about this, he said, you know, "Now I have ... my life
before September 11th of 2001, and I have my life after September 11th,
2001."
In this case, folks, the friends and family of [the victims] have two lives.
They have their life before March 26th, 2002. They have their life after
March 26th, 2002.31
In his state post-conviction relief (PCR) proceeding, Vasquez claimed that
his trial attorneys were ineffective in failing to object to the solicitor's
comments, 32 but the PCR judge denied his claim for relief.33 The South Carolina
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and agreed with Vasquez, reversing
the lower court's decision to deny his claim.3 4 As a result, the court granted
Vasquez a new sentencing hearing. 35 To reach this decision, the court began
with the general principle that "[a] solicitor's closing argument must be carefully
tailored so as not to appeal to the personal biases of the jury. . . . [It] must be
confined to evidence in the record and the reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from the evidence."3 6 A reviewing court must determine whether a
solicitor's comments were improper, and if so, whether they "so infected the trial
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." 37
Comments are improper if they "appeal to the personal bias of the juror [or are]
calculated to arouse his passion or prejudice."38
The Vasquez court began its prejudice review by focusing on the solicitor's
characterization of the defendant as a "domestic terrorist." 39 Recognizing that

31. Id. at 457-58, 698 S.E.2d at 566 (alteration in original).
32. Id. at 453, 698 S.E.2d at 564.
33. Id. at 455, 698 S.E.2d at 564-64. Even though the PCR judge found that Vasquez's trial
counsel had been "deficient" by failing to object, the judge dismissed the PCR request because he
concluded that Vasquez had not been prejudiced by trial counsel's "deficient performance." Id.
34. See id. at 450, 698 S.E.2d at 562.
35. Id. at 464-65, 698 S.E.2d at 570.
36. Id. at 458, 698 S.E.2d at 566 (citing State v. Copeland, 321 S.C. 318, 324, 468 S.E.2d
620, 624 (1996)).
37. Id. (quoting Humphries v. State, 351 S.C. 362, 373, 570 S.E.2d 160, 166 (2002)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The United States Supreme Court established this constitutional standard
for death penalty cases in Darden v. Wainwright,477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986).
38. Id. (quoting State v. Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 222, 641 S.E.2d 873, 881 (2007)); see also
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(C)(1) (2003) (mandating that the supreme court review all death
sentences to determine "[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor").
39. See id. at 457, 698 S.E.2d at 565.
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Vasquez's conduct did not fall within the legal definition of "terrorism," 40 the
court concluded, "[I]t is indisputable that the term 'terrorist,' even in the general
sense, can only conjure negative connotations. Thus, the solicitor's use of the
term was clearly improper because there was no evidentiary basis to support this
characterization."4 1 Ultimately, the court concluded:
[T]he inflammatory term characterizing [Vasquez], a Sunni Muslim,
as a "domestic terrorist" was intentionally used in conjunction with the
solicitor's extensive reference to the events of September 11, 2001. We
find the solicitor's statements improperly evoked religious prejudice
and, thus, served only to inflame the passions and prejudice of the
-42
jury.
After concluding that the solicitor's comments were improper, the court
turned to a determination of whether trial counsel's failure to object to the
improper comments prejudiced Vasquez during the penalty phase. 43 The court
noted that the combination of a Muslim defendant and a reference to 9/11
presented a novel issue in South Carolina.44 For support, the court looked to a
2005 North Carolina Court of Appeals case granting a new trial after
determining that the prosecutor's comparison of the defendant's acts to those of
the 9/11 terrorist attacks were improper and prejudicial. 45 The supreme court
also distinguished Vasquez from United States v. Hakim,

where the Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit found the State reference to the defendant's
Muslim faith "disturbing," but refused to grant relief under plain error review
because the government had offered a plausible explanation for its comments
and never drew a direct link between the defendant's faith and the 9/11 attacks.47
The Vasquez court also credited the PCR testimony of Dr. Nick DePhillips, an
expert in clinical neuropsychology, who had assessed the likely impact of the
solicitor's argument on members of the jury:
[T]he solicitor's use of the word "domestic terrorist" would have
inferred to the jury that "this is a person who ... had a plan to ... hurt
society in the same way as the people who ... planned and took out the

40. Id. at 459 & n.4, 698 S.E.2d at 567 & n.4 (citing S.C. CODE ANN § 16-23-710(18) (Supp.
2010) (defining "terrorism" to include dangerous illegal acts affecting or aimed at a broad group of
people or government)).
41. Id. at 459, 698 S.E.2d at 567.
42. Id. at 460, 698 S.E.2d at 567.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 461, 698 S.E.2d at 568 (citing State v. Millsaps, 610 S.E.2d 437, 443 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005)).
46. 344 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2003).
47. Vasquez, 388 S.C. at 461-62, 698 S.E.2d at 568 (citing Hakim, 344 F.3d at 333).
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[O]nce the solicitor used the term "terrorist," the

negative connotations associated with that term could not be removed.48
Further, the court found support in an analogous case decided by the North
Carolina Supreme Court, which determined that a prosecutor's reference to the
Columbine school shootings and the Oklahoma City bombing was prejudicial.49
The South Carolina Supreme Court noted that, in the North Carolina case, the
prosecutor's argument was held to be improper because "(1) it referred to events
and circumstances outside the record; (2) by implication, it urged jurors to
compare defendant's acts with the infamous acts of others; and (3) it attempted
to lead jurors away from the evidence by appealing instead to their sense of
passion and prejudice."5 0
While the Vasquez court recognized the "overwhelming evidence" of
Vasquez's guilt, it emphasized that "the overwhelming evidence of [a]
petitioner's guilt does not eliminate the reasonable probability that the result of
the trial would have been different had trial counsel objected to portions of the
solicitor's closing argument."5 1 Ultimately, the court saw a "reasonable
probability" that the solicitor's appeal to "anti-Muslim" sentiment had affected
the jury's decision to impose a death sentence.52 Thus, defense counsel's failure
to object to these comments was unreasonable and prejudicial.53
The Vasquez decision presents several interesting observations. First, the
court implicitly acknowledged the use of coded appeals and their potential
impact in capital cases by characterizing the solicitor's improper comments as
communicating "religious prejudice," 54 even though nothing in the comments
was explicitly religious and the solicitor made no direct references to Vasquez's
Muslim faith. 55 The prejudicial comments were not directed at the teachings or
tenets of the Muslim faith, but rather at Muslims in general.56 Even so, the court
appeared to recognize that in South Carolina merely saying "Muslim" or making

48. Id. at 454, 698 S.E.2d at 564 (first three omissions in original).
49. Id. at 462, 698 S.E.2d at 568-69 (quoting State v. Jones, 558 S.E.2d 97, 107 (N.C.
2002)).
50. Id. (quotingJones, 558 S.E.2d at 107) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. at 464, 698 S.E.2d at 569 (quoting Simmons v. State, 331 S.C. 333, 340, 503 S.E.2d
164, 167 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 463, 698 S.E.2d 569.
53. See id. at 464, 698 S.E.2d at 569-70. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984) ("A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require
reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.").
54. Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. at 464, 698 S.E.2d at 569.
55. See id. at 456-64, 698 S.E.2d at 565-69.
56. See id.
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tangential reference to Muslims in certain contexts has the potential to
communicate a wealth of bias and prejudice among parties.
Second, in its prejudice analysis, the court incorporated an awareness of the
broader cultural context in which the solicitor made his argument. For example,
the court credited the statement of Mohammed, Vasquez's spiritual leader, that
life has been hard for Muslims since 9/11.58 It also noted as well the expert
testimony of Dr. DePhilips, where he stated that merely using the word
"terrorist" has an inherently prejudicial impact and discussed the negative
connotations associated with Muslims in the United States today.59
Unfortunately, Muslims in South Carolina have not escaped the prejudice that is
prevalent throughout the country-for instance, in a discrimination complaint
reported to the Council on American-Islamic Relations in April 2007, a sixtyyear-old employee at the BMW plant near Spartanburg, South Carolina filed a
complaint stating that:

57. See id at 463-64, 698 S.E.2d at 569. Finding prejudice absent explicit religious
reference suggests a possible cultural phenomenon in which the Muslim faith is treated as a race,
identified by its stereotypical characteristics. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege:
JapaneseAmerican Redress and the "Racing" ofArab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L.J. 1,

12 (2001) ("Just as Asian Americans have been 'raced' as foreign, and from there as presumptively
disloyal [during World War II], Arab Americans and Muslims have been 'raced' as 'terrorists':
foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening." (footnote omitted)).
58. Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. at 422, 698 S.E.2d at 563; see also Muslim Americans: Middle
Class and Mostly Mainstream, PEW RES. CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (May 22, 2007),

http://people-press.org/report/329/muslim-americans-middle-class-and-mostly-mainstream
("A
majority of Muslim Americans (53%) say it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S.
since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks."). The 2009 Civil Rights Report of the Council on AmericanIslamic Relations shows a continued increase in civil rights complaints filed by American Muslims
in 2008-up 3 % from 2007 and 11% from 2006. COuNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS,
THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2009: SEEKING FULL INCLUSION, 7

(2009), available at http://www.cair.com/portals/0/pdf/cair-2009-civil-rights-report.pdf. After 9/11,
civil rights complaints rose rapidly and have remained high; however, the reported number of hate
crimes appears to be decreasing. See id. at 8 fig.1, 9 fig.2.
59. See Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. at 454, 698 S.E.2d at 574. The news media continues to
show examples of prejudice against Muslims. For example, the proposed building of a new mosque
near the site of the former World Trade Center in New York City has been met with significant
opposition. See Public Remains Conflicted Over Islam, PEW RES. CENTER, 3 & fig. (Aug 24,

2010), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/647.pdf (finding that 62% of Americans support the right
of Muslims to build houses of worship, but 510%object to the building of a mosque near the World
Trade Center). Frustrations over the proposed mosque recently culminated when a small church in
Florida gained worldwide attention with its plan to burn copies of the Koran on the ninth
anniversary of 9/11. See Damien Cave & Anne Barnard, FloridaMinister Wavers on Plans to Burn

the Koran, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2010, at A3. Faced with international criticism, the church's
pastor ultimately cancelled the planned demonstration, but only after the imam of the proposed
mosque supposedly promised to choose a different location. Id. Additionally, the use of the term
"terrorist" continues to plague Muslims, as shown by a recent bullying incident in New York City
where, over a period of several months, four teenagers called one of their Muslim classmates a
"terrorist" and physically abused him. See NYC Teens Charged with Anti-Muslim Hate Crime,

USATODAY.COM, Oct. 11, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010-10-1 1-muslim-hatenyc N.htm.
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. repeatedly made comments to him such as,

"Muslims are no good. They should all be killed," and, "We will f**k
up your family, we'll kill you all." This situation escalated when one of
the co-workers confronted the Muslim in a restroom at work, put a
boxcutter to his throat, and said: "I'll slice your throat and kill you." 60
The remainder of this Note focuses on how religious arguments in capital
cases are presented through coded appeals, explores why an understanding of the
cultural context in which these coded appeals are made is a necessary part of a
court's prejudice analysis, and concludes with a discussion of why South
Carolina's culture heightens susceptibility to coded religious appeals.
III. RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS IN CAPITAL CASES

There are four well-established areas of constitutional law that the United
States Supreme Court has applied to religious arguments in capital cases: (1) the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause; (2) the Eighth Amendment's
protections against cruel and unusual punishment; (3) the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) the First Amendment's protections of free
speech, association, and religion. This Part briefly discusses these four areas of
constitutional law, evaluates how the South Carolina Supreme Court has applied
these constitutional principles when considering improper closing arguments in
death penalty cases, and discusses how the Vasquez decision aligns with
precedent.
A. ConstitutionalLimits on Religious Comments in ClosingArguments
1. Establishment Clause
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause
to prevent the State (including state actors such as prosecutors), from placing "its
power or prestige behind religion." 61 The Court reviews state actions to
determine whether they were made "either for the purpose, or with the primary
effect, of endorsing religion." 62 In the context of capital cases, rather than
proselytizing or endorsing religion, prosecutors use religious arguments to secure

60. Amany R. Hacking, A New Dawnfor Muslims: Asserting Their Civil Rights in Post-911
America, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917, 923-24 (2010) (footnote omitted) (quoting COUNCIL ON
AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
2008: WITHOUT FEAR OF DISCRIMINATION 23 (2008), available at http://www.cair.com/Portals/O/
pdf/civilrights2008.pdf.
61. See, e.g., John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Don't Take His Eye, Don't Take His
Tooth, and Don't Cast the First Stone: Limiting Religious Arguments in Capital Cases, 9 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 61, 87 (2000) ("Most religious arguments made by prosecutors are improper and
should be precluded because they infringe upon one or more constitutional rights.").
62. Id.
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a death sentence, which leaves to a reviewing court the task of evaluating
whether the probable effect of a statement was to give the underlying religion
power or prestige in the minds of the jury.6 3 The majority of religious references
in capital cases that have been deemed to run afoul of the Establishment Clause
had their origins in various commands, stories, or verses of the Bible. 64 For
example, a Biblical reference used by prosecutors suggests that the State, or the
prosecutor himself, "is the servant of God to execute his wrath on the
wrongdoer." 65 This reference tends to place the State's power and prestige
behind the Christian religion because it refers to a well-known biblical verse, 66
which has been used by prominent Christian organizations to claim that the State
has been given divine authority to impose capital punishment.6 7
2.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, the Court has recognized two principles that are relevant to a
prosecutor's religious arguments. Such comments cannot (1) have the effect of
reducing the jury's perception of its responsibility for returning a death sentence
or (2) draw the jury away from an individualized assessment of the defendant. 69
For example, in Sandoval v. Calderson,70 the prosecutor's penalty phase closing
argument violated both of these principles:
Don't once think that you have to feel burdened and
depressed because I voted for death....

63. See id.
64. See id. at 64.
65. Id. at 67 (quoting Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
66. See generally Romans 13:4 (New American Standard) ("For [the governing authority] is
a minister of God to you for good. But if you do what is evil, be afraid; for it does not bear the
sword for nothing; for it is a minister of God, an avenger who brings wrath upon the one who
practices evil.").
67. For example, the Southern Baptist Convention adopted a resolution expressing its
opinion on the death penalty that states:
WHEREAS, God . .. has established capital punishment as a just and appropriate
means by which the civil magistrate may punish those guilty of capital crimes ....
Therefore, be it RESOLVED, That the messengers to the Southern Baptist Convention. .
. support the fair and equitable use of capital punishment by civil magistrates as a
legitimate form of punishment for those guilty of murder or treasonous acts that result in
death ....
SBC Resolutions: On Capital Punishment, S. BAPTIST CONVENTION (June 2000),
http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=299 [hereinafter SBC Resolutions].
68. See Blume & Johnson, supranote 61, at 89.
69. See id. at 89-90 (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
70. 241 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2001).
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[Defense counsel] says don't play God. Let every person
be in subjection to the governing authoritiesfor there is no
authority except from God and those which are established by
God. Therefore, he who resists authority has opposed the
ordinance of God, and they who have opposed will receive
condemnations upon themselves for rulers are not a cause of
fear for good behavior, but for evil. Do you want to have no
fear of authority? Do what is good andyou will have praisefor
the same for it is a minister of God to you for good. But ifyou
do what is evil, be afraidfor it does not bear the sword for
nothingfor it is a minister of God an avenger who brings wrath
upon one who practices evil.
You are not playing God. You are doing what God says.
This might be the only opportunity to wake [the defendant] up.
God will destroy the body to save the soul. Make him get
himselfright.1

In Sandoval, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor's
argument, suggesting that the ultimate responsibility for judgment rests with God
and the jurors were simply carrying out "what God says," violated the Eighth
Amendment by reducing the jury's perception of its weighty responsibility and
potentially causing the jury to "give less weight to, or perhaps even disregard,
the legal instructions given it by the trial judge in favor of the asserted higher
law." 7 The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the invocation of a "higher law"
violated the Eighth Amendment by allowing the jury to disregard its legal
responsibility to assess the applicability of the death penalty to the individual
defendant on trial.73 The court underscored that "[t]he Biblical concepts of
vengeance invoked by the prosecution . . . do not recognize . . . a refined

[individualized] approach."74
3.

Due Process

Due process places additional limits on religious arguments; under a due
process analysis, courts evaluate "whether the prosecutor's comments 'so
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process.'" 75 As Professors John H. Blume and Sheri Lynn Johnson explain,
"This is a high standard, and unlike [analysis rooted in the Establishment Clause
and the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause], [it] takes

71.

Id. at 775 n.1 (first alteration in original).

72. Id. at 776.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75.

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,

416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
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into account whether the objectionable comment was invited by defense counsel,
at least to the extent that the defense counsel's comments limited the damage
done by the prosecutor's remarks."76 Under the concept of "invited response," if
a reviewing court determines that the improper comments were invited by or
made in response to defense counsel's argument, it is less likely to find that the
comments resulted in an unfair trial.
To determine whether due process is satisfied, courts have formulated a twoprong approach78 that analyzes (1) whether the challenged comments are
improper, and (2) if improper, whether the prejudiced the defendant, denying
him a fair trial before an impartial jury.
Under the second prong, courts
employ a broad set of factors to evaluate prejudice, including "the extent of the
improper conduct, the issuance of curative instructions from the court, any
defense conduct inviting the response, and the weight of the evidence."80
4.

FirstAmendment Rights

Finally, the United States Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment's guarantees of free speech, freedom of association, and freedom of
religion restrict a prosecutor's ability to use the defendant's exercise of any of
these rights in arguing for a death sentence81 unless the defendant's exercise
relates to the crime, relates to the defendant's future dangerousness, or is used to
rebut mitigating evidence offered by the defendant.82 For example, in Davis v.

76. Blume & Johnson, supra note 61, at 92.
77. See, e.g., Darden, 477 U.S. at 182 ("Much of the objectionable content was invited by or
was responsive to the opening summation of the defense. . . . [T]he idea of 'invited response' is
used not to excuse improper comments, but to determine their effect on the trial as a whole." (citing
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985))).
78. E.g., Ellison v. Acevedo, 593 F.3d 625, 635-36 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Darden established a
two-prong test for determining whether a prosecutor's comments in closing argument constitute a
denial of due process." (citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 181; Barlett v. Battaglia, 453 F.3d 796, 800 (7th
Cir. 2006))).
79. Id. at 636 (citing Ruvalcaba v. Chandler, 416 F.3d 555, 565 (7th Cir. 2005)).
80. Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted)
(citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82; DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 645); see also Middlebrooks v.
Bell, 619 F.3d 526, 543 (6th Cir. 2010) ("To determine flagrancy, we consider four factors: '(1) the
likelihood that the remarks of the prosecutor tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant;
(2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the remarks were deliberately or
accidentally made; and (4) the total strength of the evidence against the defendant."' (quoting Bates
v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 641(6th Cir. 2005))); Ellison, 593 F.3d at 636 ("Among the factors to be
considered by the court in deciding whether the defendant was prejudiced by the comments are: '(1)
whether the prosecutor misstated the evidence, (2) whether the remarks implicate specific rights of
the accused, (3) whether the defense invited the response, (4) the trial court's instructions, (5) the
weight of the evidence against the defendant, and (6) the defendant's opportunity to rebut."'
(quoting Howard v. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 793 (7th Cir. 2000))).
81. See Blume & Johnson, supra note 61, at 93 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885
(1983)).
82. See id. (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1992)).
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State,83 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a defendant's conversion
to Satanism while on death row could legitimately be used as evidence of his
future dangerousness. The court saw no error where the prosecutor had
requested during the penalty phase that the defendant stand up in court, lift his
shirt, and show the jury his Satanic tattoo.84 The constitutional protection of the
First Amendment is likely to be invoked by a defendant if he is a member of an
unpopular religious group, such as Muslims today, or if he maintains an
association with a group that holds a socially or politically unpopular viewpoint,
such as the Aryan Nation.85
B. Survey ofSouth CarolinaPrecedent

When evaluating claims of improper and prejudicial arguments in capital
cases, the South Carolina Supreme Court uses a two-prong test: (1) whether the
argument was improper, 8 6 and (2) if so, whether the argument was so prejudicial
that it had the effect of denying the defendant a fair trial.
Even where
comments are adjudged to be proper, the court will analyze their prejudicial
impact under section 16-3-25(C) of the South Carolina Code,88 which broadly
asks whether the death sentence was imposed under influence of passion or
prejudice and whether the comments inserted an arbitrary factor into the jury's
deliberation.89
Precedent is clear that arguments that tend to reduce the weight of a juror's
responsibility, 90 that refer to the solicitor's personal opinion regarding the
sentence, 91 or that use a "golden rule argument," which asks the jurors to place
themselves in the shoes of the victim, are improper.92 However, precedent also
suggests that prejudice analysis of penalty phase arguments can be murky, and
often includes a number of variable factors such as whether the improper

83. No. AP-74,393, 2010 WL 3766661 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2010).
84. See id. at *1-2.

85. See, e.g., Dawson, 503 U.S. at 166-68 (holding that the prosecution's introduction of
evidence of defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood during the penalty phase violated
his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights where it did not relate to the crime, was general in
nature, was not probative of future dangerousness, and was not offered to rebut relevant mitigating
evidence offered by the defense).
86. See Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. 447, 458, 698 S.E.2d 561, 566 (2010) (quoting State v.
Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 222, 641 S.E.2d 873, 881 (2007)) (citing State v. Copeland, 321 S.C. 318,
324, 468 S.E.2d 620, 624 (1996)).
87. See id. (quoting Humphries v. State, 351 S.C. 362, 373, 570 S.E.2d 160, 166 (2002);
Simmons v. State, 331 S.C. 333, 338, 503 S.E.2d 164, 166 (1998)).
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(C) (2003).
89.

See id.

90. See Williams v. Ozmint, 380 S.C. 473, 479, 671 S.E.2d 600, 602 (2008) (quoting State v.
Woomer, 277 S.C. 170, 175, 284 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1981)).
91. See Northcutt, 372 S.C. at 223, 641 S.E.2d at 881. However, as a standalone factor, the
prejudicial impact of a solicitor's personal opinion may be limited. See Williams, 380 S.C. at 479,
671 S.E.2d at 602 (citing Woomer, 277 S.C. at 175, 284 S.E.2d at 359).
92. See Van Dohlen v. State, 360 S.C. 598, 609, 602 S.E.2d 738, 743-44 (2004).
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comments were consistent with evidence in "the record and reasonable
inferences from it"; 93 whether the judge offered a curative instruction; 94 "the
nature of the [comments] and the circumstances under which they were made"; 9 5
whether the comments were an invited response;96 and how clearly the
defendant's guilt was established.97 These factors closely track those used by the
United States Supreme Court in Darden v. Wainwright,98 which instructed that
an evaluation of prejudicial impact of a prosecutor's improper comments should
consider (1) whether the comments manipulated or misstated the evidence,
improperly implicated specific rights of the accused, were an invited response by
the defense (thereby lessening their effect), or were addressed with a curative
instruction by the judge; (2) whether the weight of the evidence is "heavy"; and
(3) whether defense counsel rebutted the improper comments. 99 The South
Carolina Supreme Court has stressed the difficulty in evaluating the prejudicial
impact of improper comments during the penalty phase, commenting that "the
evaluation of the consequences of an error in the sentencing phase of a capital
case [is] more difficult because of the discretion that is given to the sentencing
jury.100A capital jury can recommend a life sentence for any reason or no reason at
all."
The South Carolina Supreme Court has not previously indicated that cultural
understanding is relevant to its analysis, even in cases challenging comments that
likely would be understood by the culture at large as derogatory racial
remarks. 101 Thus, the court's opinion in Vasquez departs from its historical

93. Northcutt, 372 S.C. at 222 n.6, 641 S.E.2d at 881 n.6; see also State v. Copeland, 321
S.C. 318, 326, 468 S.E.2d 620, 625 (1996) ("We take this opportunity to caution counsel to confine
their comments to the facts presented and reasonable inferences from such facts.").
94. See State v. Shuler, 353 S.C. 176, 187-88, 577 S.E.2d 438, 444 (2003) (citing Johnson v.
State, 325 S.C. 182, 188, 480 S.E.2d 733, 735-36 (1997); State v. Irvin, 270 S.C. 539, 544, 243
S.E.2d 195, 197 (1978)).
95. State v. Bennett, 369 S.C. 219, 231, 632 S.E.2d 281, 288 (2006) (quoting S.C. State
Highway Dep't v. Nasim, 255 S.C. 406, 411, 179 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1971)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
96. See, e.g., id. at 232, 632 S.E.2d at 289 ("[T]he trial court correctly found that 'King
Kong' was an invited response to [the defendant's] mitigation evidence."); Humphries v. State, 351
S.C. 362, 376, 570 S.E.2d 160, 168 (2002) (determining that the defendant's introduction of "his
own difficult childhood and background" invited comparison between the defendant's and the
victim's "respective characters even before the solicitor gave his closing remarks").
97. See, e.g., Bennett, 369 S.C. at 232, 632 S.E.2d at 288 ("[T]his case involved a brutal
murder, where guilt was clearly established. Accordingly, we find no evidence of prejudice from
the 'blond lady' remark."); State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 169, 478 S.E.2d 260, 268 (1996)
("[T]here was such overwhelming evidence of [the defendant]'s guilt, no prejudice could possibly
have resulted. We find no error.").
98. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
99. See id. at 181-82 (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985)).
100. State v McClure, 342 S.C. 403, 409, 537 S.E.2d 273, 275 (2000) (citing State v. Hicks,
330 S.C. 207, 218, 499 S.E.2d 209, 215 (1998); State v. Atkins, 303 S.C. 214, 221, 399 S.E.2d 760,
764 (1990); State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 660, 258 S.E.2d 559, 566 (1979)).
101. See Bennett, 369 S.C. at 231-32, 632 S.E.2d at 288-89. There, the court recognized "that
the terms 'blond lady' and 'King Kong' could have racial connotations," id. at 231, 632 S.E.2d at
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approach when analyzing improper comments for prejudice. Unlike the court in
State v. Bennett,102-which recognized racial connotations in the terms "King
Kong" and "blond lady" when referring to an African-American defendant and a
white witness, but stopped short of evaluating historical and current racial
tensions to determine their prejudicial impact -the court in Vasquez was
willing to give significant weight to testimony about broader cultural conditions.
For instance, it relied on Vasquez's expert witness's testimony that "domestic
terrorist" connoted to the jury someone who "had a plan to ... hurt society in the
same way as the people who ... planned and took out the 9/11 attacks," and that
this negative connotation "could not be removed." 10 4 Further, the court was
willing to hold that the solicitor injected "religious prejudice" into the case,
despite the lack of any explicit reference to Vasquez's Muslim faith. 105 Given
the court's historical hesitancy to find comments improper in the context of the
record-and its propensity to find improper comments not prejudicial-the
court's decision in Vasquez is all the more striking. In fact, the dissent echoes
the court's traditional posture, arguing that the solicitor's comments were proper
as "an acceptable introduction to the victim impact evidence," and concluding
that "in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt established at trial and the
statutory aggravating factors, there is no reasonable probability that the jury
would not have recommended the death penalty but for the solicitor's
comments."10 6
The fact that the Vasquez court specifically determined that there was
"religious prejudice" despite any explicit references to religion shows its
awareness of the use of a coded appeal. The language of coded appeals must be
interpreted within the context of the culture in which they are expressed if their
prejudicial impact is to be evaluated accurately. 10 7 Logically, a coded appeal
only has a prejudicial impact when the listener understands its biased meaning
and applies that meaning to the decision at hand. The difficulty in determining
whether a jury is influenced by prejudicial comments, particularly given its
discretion for mercy in the penalty phase, is compounded when coded appeals

288, but found that the use of these terms was not improper, see id. Because the defendant's "size
and strength were probative of the aggravating circumstance of physical torture," the court reasoned
that the "use of the term 'King Kong' was not suggestive of a giant black gorilla who abducts a
white woman, but rather, descriptive of [the defendant's] size and strength as they related to his past
crimes." Id. at 232, 632 S.E.2d at 288.
102. 369 S.C. 219, 632 S.E.2d 281 (2006).
103. See id. at 231-32, 632 S.E.2d at 288-89.
104. Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. 447, 454, 698 S.E.2d 561, 564 (2010) (omissions in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Id. at 464, 698 S.E.2d at 569.
106. Id. at 465, 468, 698 S.E.2d at 570, 571 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
107. See generally George H. Taylor, StructuralTextualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 364 (1995)
("[W]ords are not self-defining; their meaning depends on both culture and context." (alteration in
original) (quoting CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 114 (1990))).
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must first be decoded by the court. 108 In Vasquez, the court found enough
support in the culture at large to infer a prejudicial impact in the sentencing
phase. 109
IV. CODED APPEALS AND SUBCONSCIOUS PREJUDICE

The solicitor's use of the phrase "domestic terrorist" exem lifies a coded
appeal-words used to "activate latent, subconscious prejudice'10 and elicit a
sympathetic response. Rejecting the explanation offered by the solicitor at the
PCR hearing that "the jury could have interpreted the term 'terrorist' in the
general sense that [Vasquez] 'struck fear in the hearts of innocent people,"' the
Vasquez court instead concluded that the solicitor "intentionally used [the term]
in conjunction with the solicitor's extensive reference to the events of September
11, 2001."Il

Coded appeals have been discussed primarily in the context of race. In her
1993 article, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, Professor Johnson discusses

how prosecutors have used racial imagery in closing arguments to identify white
with good and black with evil; 112 to convey an "image of African Americans as
more violent and more criminal than whites";113 to portray defendants "as
animal-like or subhuman in some other way";114 to convey black men as a
"sexual threat" to white women;' 15 to argue "[b]lack dishonesty";1 16 and to
convey an "us-them" mentality by "portray[ing] black-on-white violence as more
horrible than other violence" or by drawing on differences to destroy any
empathy for the defendant.117 Another commentator, Ryan Patrick Alford, notes
that "[t]here is a great incentive for the government to incite racism from jurors
to secure convictions; however, no countervailing disincentive has emerged as
yet, since the appellate courts are either unwilling or unable to recognize

108. See, e.g., State v. White, 246 S.C. 502, 507, 144 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1965) ("In view of the
absolute discretion of the jury with regard to the issue of mercy, it is impossible to determine
whether the argument actually had a prejudicial effect upon the verdict. . . . While we seriously
doubt that the argument of the Solicitor had the claimed prejudicial effect and reach our result with
reluctance, the probabilities of prejudice to the rights of the defendant are such that we would not be
justified in assuming in a death case that it did not result.").
109. See Vasquez, 388 S.C. at 463-64, 698 S.E.2d at 569.
110. Brook K. Baker, TranscendingLegacies of Literacy and Transforming the Traditional
Repertoire: CriticalDiscourseStrategiesfor Practice,23 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 491, 540 (1997).
111. Vasquez, 388 S.C at 454-55, 460, 698 S.E.2d at 564, 567.
112. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TuL. L. REv. 1739, 1751

(1993).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1753.
115. Id. at 1754.
116. Id. at 1755.
117. Id. at 1756; see id at 1757.
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implicitly racist argumentation." 1 8 Alford suggests that racial rhetoric is used
most frequently by prosecutors in closing arguments because it is both the
climax of the trial and the point at which prosecutors have the greatest latitude
with their arguments. 119
Within the framework of traditional rhetoric theory, the speaker seeks to
establish a connection with his audience, convince them that what he is telling
them is correct, and then move them to action.120 Examining closing arguments
in criminal trials, Alford posits:
First is the importance of forming a personal connection between
yourself and the jury based on shared beliefs and attitudes, thus creating
a positive ethos that will predispose the jurors to be persuaded by your
arguments. Second is appealing to the emotions of the jurors, so that
they are not only inclined to believe that your arguments are correct, but
to be moved to action through an emotional reaction. 121
A former prosecutor explains this strategy:
I knew that from the start of a trial to the end, emotion had very much to
do with the outcome. In choosing jurors, we would look for those
whose experiences would, through the emotion of empathy, pull to our
side. In our opening statements, we were taught to tell the story of the
case in a whole and real way so that it would engage the emotions of the
jurors from the outset. When I put a victim on the stand as a witness, I
would not stop or comfort her if she started to cry because I knew the
effect that her tears were having on the jury. When cross-examining
defense witnesses, I was trying to manipulate their emotions, too, by
making them angry and frustrated so that their stories would break

118. Ryan Patrick Alford, Appellate Review of Racist Summations: Redeeming the Promise of
SearchingAnalysis, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325, 363 (2006).
119. See id. at 329. Closing arguments typically conjure up images of stately lawyers orating
to an edge-of-their-seat attentive jury, but in the modem era technology has changed the way that
jurors process information and has enhanced the ability of lawyers to communicate with jurors
through visual images.

See Gregory J. Morse, Techno-Jury: Techniques in Verbal and Visual

Persuasion,54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 241, 242-43 (2010) ("Lawyers must keep in mind that people
today have access to information twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. . . . [They] must
convey information to the jury quickly and concisely with clarifying visual support and verbal
cues."). South Carolina courts are no strangers to the use of visual persuasion in death penalty
cases. See, e.g., State v. Bixby, 388 S.C. 528, 554-57, 698 S.E.2d 572, 586-87 (2010) (finding no
prejudice where the solicitor played a seven-minute film during sentencing that showed footage of a
slain deputy's funeral, including the folding of an American flag over the coffin and a mock 911
call telling him to return home from duty); State v. Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 222-23, 641 S.E.2d
873, 881 (2007) (finding prejudice where the solicitor "concluded his argument by producing a
large black shroud and draping it over the baby [victim]'s crib.... in a staged funeral procession").
120. Alford, supra note 118, at 334.
121. Id.
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down. Finally the closing would come, and I would try to create a
whole range of emotions: empathy for the victim, anger at the
defendant, admiration for the police officers who investigated the case,
and frustration that nothing had been done about the defendant sooner.
While the law professors and courts may wring the law dry of emotion,
those who tell the stories of the case know better about what is the heart
ofjustice.122
In line with Johnson's concept of creating an "us-them" mentality, 123 Alford
outlines one of the most effective ways for a prosecutor to appeal to jurors:
[D]efine the defendant as a member of the "other." In that way, the
speaker can draw a line around the defendant, locating both herself and
her audience on the same opposite of that line-thereby defining the
attorney as a trustworthy member of the jurors' community. Defining
the defendant as someone outside of the moral communit1 can also
induce a negative emotional response towards the defendant.
Another technique used to "other-ize" the defendant, which was used in
Vasquez, is to define him in terms of a larger community or by reference to the
person's "classification within a group."125 The most effective persuader
understands the background and biases of the jury and appeals to the same. 126
Professor Brook K. Baker suggests that cultural stereotypes begin to form at
an early age, and by adulthood they typically reside in the "habitual, and
therefore unconscious, parts of our mental processes."127 These stereotypes can
be activated not only by "direct appeals to pejorative terms and ideologies of
superiority [but also with] code words, associated secondary attributes, and other
metonymic devices." 12 8 Baker explains that "metonymy-the part evokes the
whole-is particularly powerful in elucidating the cognitive processes of
bias,"1 29 and describes two metonymic devices:

122. MARK WILLIAM OSLER, JESUS ON DEATH Row: THE TRIAL OF JESUS AND AMERICAN

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 83-84 (2009). Before becoming a law school professor in 2001, Mark Osler

was a career federal prosecutor in Detroit, Michigan. Id. at 1.
123. Johnson, supra note 112, at 1756-59.
124. Alford, supra note 118, at 335 (footnote omitted).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 336; see also Morse, supra note 119, at 246 ("Keeping the background of each
juror in mind will better enable lawyers to choose words, concepts, and ideas that have a greater
impact on them." (citing G. Marc Whitehead, Juror Persuasion: New Ideas, New Techniques,
LITIG., Winter 2000, at 34, 35)).

127. Baker, supra note 110, at 540.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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First, metonymy describes how the whole group can be tarnished
by the negative behavioral and attitudinal features of particular
group members. In essence, the negative feature of an individual
is considered to be representative-it is generalized to be
characteristic of the entire, now despised social group. Thus, the
first form of metonymy, the negative exemplar (e.g., a youth
gang member), comes to epitomize the whole outsider group
(youth of color).
. . . [Second,] a single element or symbolic representation of a
stereotype can elicit the entire negative schema and aversive
reaction.
[For example,] describing Rodney King as
"uncontrollable" conjures the aggregating stereotype of dangerous

Black men.130
Baker argues that the legal requirement for relevancy only excludes the most
egregious appeals to bias.131 In fact, he asserts that:
[T]he relevance barrier is permeable with respect to the corrosive effect
of indirect appeals to stereotypes and master stories of race, gender,
class, sexual orientation, and disability. By code words, connotation,
and metaphor, the "skilled" advocate can construct his or her party
opponent around the cultural icons of race and gender .... The lawyers
who are subtlest in fashioning their appeals to bias, those who seduce
the decision-maker without raising suspicion, are credited with being the

most skilled. 13 2
Turning back to Vasquez, one can easily recognize the concepts that these
commentators discuss. Some of the same categorizations that Professor Johnson
describes as applying to black defendants (evil, violent, dishonest, "us-them"
mentality) could easily apply to Vasquez once the solicitor labeled him a
"domestic terrorist" and connected him to the Muslims that perpetrated the 9/11
attacks. The solicitor's 9/11 narrative is also a clear example of Professor
Alford's description of the rhetorical theory. First, it drew a connection between
the solicitor and the jury, who all witnessed the 9/11 attacks, and then it pricked
the listeners' emotions by evoking the painful loss of life on 9/11. Labeling
Vasquez a "domestic terrorist" had the effect of drawing a circle around the
solicitor and the jury, thus placing the defendant, a Muslim, outside of that
circle. Finally, the 9/11 narrative is an example of Baker's first metonymy,
suggesting that the character of the small group of extreme Muslims who carried

130. Id. at 540-42 (footnotes omitted).
131. Id. at 544.
132. Id.
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out the 9/11 attacks now exemplifies the entire population of Muslims. The use
of "domestic terrorist" also exemplifies Baker's second metonymy-one word or
phrase that has come to characterize all Muslims as part of a larger plot to
terrorize the people of the United States. The Vasquez court correctly concluded
that the solicitor's comments were religious prejudice and improper as such.133
V. CULTURAL CONTEXT

A.

Introduction

Coded appeals have their intended effect when the listener hears the coded
language and draws on his cultural environment to decode what the
communicator intends to convey. 13 4 In holding that the solicitor's comments
were improper as religious prejudice, absent an express reference to Vasquez's
religion, the court necessarily had to draw on the cultural environment outside
the record at the time and place the comments were made. Reaching outside of
the record to evaluate prejudice is a new step for the court in evaluating improper
closing arguments in capital cases. If the court is charting a new course in its
prejudice analysis by taking into consideration the cultural environment, then
South Carolina's culture presents some interesting hurdles for solicitors to
overcome in order for religious arguments in capital cases to withstand judicial
scrutiny.
B. Religious Culture
1. GeneralBackground

Polls show that Christianity is the largest religion in the United States,
comprising nearly 78% of the population (approximately 54% Protestant and
24% Catholic). 135 The "traditional Bible-Belt states" in the South have the
highest concentration of Protestants and other non-Catholic Christians and the
lowest concentration of Catholics. 13 6 In South Carolina, one poll reveals that
75% of the state identifies itself as "Protestant/Other Christian," and 8.8%

133. But cf United States v. Hakim, 344 F.3d 324, 333 (3d Cir. 2003) ("While we find the
government's mention of [defendant] Hakim's religion disturbing, we conclude that Hakim cannot
demonstrate that it amounted to plain error."); State v. Mack, 850 So. 2d 1035, 1044, 1045 (La. Ct.
App. 2003) ("Considering the evidence in its entirety, we cannot say that the reference to
defendant's Muslim name [at trial shortly after 9/11] was of such an inflammatory nature as to have
had a prejudicial impact on the jury. In other words, the evidence was overwhelmingly sufficient
such that, even without the remarks or references to defendant's Muslim name, the jury could have
found defendant guilty.").
134. See Alford, supra note 118, at 334-36; Morse, supra note 119, at 246.
135. See Newport, supra note 12.
136. Id.
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identifies itself as Catholic, for a total of 84% Christian.137 South Carolina has
among the highest concentrations of Protestants (ranking sixth) and lowest
concentrations of Catholics (ranking forty-sixth) in the United States. 13 8 Other
states with similar concentrations include West Virginia, North Carolina,
Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and
Oklahoma.139 In a related poll, South Carolina ranked third in the top ten states
for church attendance, with 56% of residents attending weekly or almost every
week. 140
Recent polls also show that views about Muslims among religious groups
are generally negative and support an inference of prejudice. A 2009 Pew
Research Center Survey, View of Religious Similarities and Differences:
Muslims Widely Seen as Facing Discrimination, presented the following

findings-(1) 58% of adults "say that Muslims are subject to a lot of
discrimination"; (2) "[a]mong conservative Republicans, 55% say Islam is more
likely than other faiths to encourage violence"; and (3) "[w]hite evangelical
Protestants are significantly more likely than other religious groups to say Islam
is inclined toward violence, with more than half (53%) taking this view."14 1 This
negative view of Muslims can also be seen in a more recent 2010 Pew Research
Center poll exploring views on the proposed mosque near the site of the 9/11
World Trade Center attacks.142 The survey shows that 51% of Americans object
to building a center and mosque for Muslims near the site of the former World
Trade Center, while at the same time, 62% of Americans support equal rights for
Muslims to build houses of worship. 14 3 Along politically partisan lines,
Republicans tend to express unfavorable opinions of Islam "[b]y more than twoto-one (54% to 21%)" compared to Democrats, among whom "favorable
opinions of Islam outnumber unfavorable ones (41% to 27%)"; also, 74% of
Republicans object to the building of the mosque near Ground Zero, compared to
144
39% of Democrats.
Taking these polls in the aggregate, they tend to suggest
that a cultural environment that is highly religious and predominantly
Republican contributes to a higher likelihood of bias towards Muslims.

137. Id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. Frank Newport, Mississippians Go to Church the Most; Vermonters, Least, GALLUP
(Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/125999/mississippians-go-church-most-vermontersleast.aspx.
141. Views of Religious Similarities and Differences: Muslims Widely Seen as Facing
Discrimination,PEW RES. CENTER, 1, 7 (2009), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/542.pdf.
142. PEW RES. CENTER, supra note 58.
143. Id. at 1, 4.
144. Id. at 2, 3.
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South Carolinaand the Death Penalty

A national poll conducted by Gallup in 2009 shows that 65% of Americans
support use of the death penalty for convicted murderers.145 This level of
support has remained roughly consistent over the past decade.146 The poll
includes several other interesting findings, including-(1) nearly 49% of
Americans say that "the death penalty is not imposed often enough"; (2) 59% of
Americans believe that over the past five years, "a person has been executed
under the death penalty who was, in fact, innocent of the crime he or she was
charged with"; and (3) 34% of Americans "believe an innocent person has been
executed and at the same time support the death penalty."1 47 The Gallup poll
also asked about partisan differences among those polled and found that 81% of
Republicans support the death penalty, compared to 67% of Independents and
48% of Democrats.148 National polls asking about the composition of partisan
groups found that "[a]bout 9 out of 10 Republicans are non-Hispanic whites, and
more than half of these are highly religious."149 This compares with 24% of
Independents and 19% of Democrats who "can be classified as highly
religious."150 These polls have interesting implications for the death penalty in a
state such as South Carolina, where many citizens are highly religious and have
historically voted Republican in major elections.151

145. Frank Newport, In US., Two-Thirds Continue to Support Death Penalty, GALLUP (Oct.

13,
2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/123638/In-U.S.-Two-Thirds-Continue-Support-DeathPenalty.aspx. Gallup has been conducting this poll for more than 70 years. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. In his 2009 book, Jesus on Death Row, Mark Osler notes that political supporters of
the death penalty who also profess allegiance to the Christian faith have reached the pinnacle of our
political structure-"Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush strongly supported and expanded
the use of the death penalty while both proclaimed a faith whose primary public symbol, the cross,
is itself the representation of an instrument of execution." OSLER, supra note 122, at 3. Professor
Osler draws parallels between the death penalty in today's society and the trial and execution of
Jesus Christ, finding that "[i]n a nation where 85 percent of the population identifies itself as
Christian, [and where] the debate over capital punishment and other criminal issues is necessarily
going to be largely among Christians," there is a surprising lack of discussion on "the troubling
account of Jesus Christ as a criminal defendant." Id.
149. Frank Newport, Republicans Remain Disproportionately White and Religious, GALLUP

(Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/142826/Republicans-Remain-DisproportionatelyWhite-Religious.aspx ("Whites classified as highly religious are those who say religion is important
in their daily lives and who report attending religious services weekly or almost every week.").
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Election Information: Election Statistics, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/member info/electionlnfo/index.aspx (last visited

May 17, 2011) (collecting and reporting "official vote counts for federal elections" for all the states
since 1920). Over the past fifty years, a majority of South Carolina's citizens have voted for the
democratic candidate in only two presidential elections-Jimmy Carter in 1976 and John F.
Kennedy in 1960. See Benjamin J.Guthrie under direction of Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr., Statistics of
the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 2, 1976, CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES,

44

(Apr.

15,

1977),
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In a 2001 article, ForecastingLife and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and
Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, the authors used data compiled by the

Capital Jury Projectl52 and interviewed "187 jurors who served on 53 capital
cases tried in South Carolina between 1986 and 1997."1 53 They focused their
inquiry on the juror's first vote (based on the premise that the majority after the
first vote tends to control the final verdict) and asked the jurors a number of
questions aimed at discovering what leads a juror to vote for death. 154 They
found that race matters in that "[b]lack jurors are substantially more likely than
white jurors to vote for life on the first ballot, but not on the final one."15 This
is because "[a]ll jurors tend in the end to vote with the initial majority, which for
the cases in our sample means a white majority." 56 They also found that
religion matters in that "[j]urors who identify themselves as Southern Baptists
(almost all of whom are white) are apt to cast their first vote for death."157
"Nearly 80 percent of Southern Baptists vote for death on the first vote
compared to about 50 percent of jurors of other denominations."ss Finally, they
found that support for the death penalty matters in that "[c]apital juries often
contain members whose support for the death penalty undermines their
impartiality and renders them legally ineligible to serve. 159 Once seated, these
jurors push the final verdict heavily toward death."1 60 The authors concluded:
[O]ur findings validate the instincts on which many prosecutors and
defense lawyers have probably long relied. On the basis of our analysis,

1976election.pdf; Benjamin J. Guthrie under direction of Ralph R. Roberts, Statistics of the
Presidential and Congressional Election of November 8, 1960, CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 41 (Apr. 15, 1961), http://clerk.house.gov/member-info/electionInfo/
1960election.pdf; David Leip, United States PresidentialElection Results, DAVE LEIP'S ATLAS OF
U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ (last visited May 17, 2011).

152. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and
Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 278 (2001). The Capital Jury Project
(CJP) began in 1991 as a collaboration among a number of research institutions supported by grants
from the National Science Foundation. See What is the CapitalJury Project?, SCH. OF CRIM. JUST.
UNIV. AT ALB., http://www.albany.edu/scj/CJPwhat.htm (last updated Apr. 21, 2009). In its own
words, "the CJP was designed to: (1) systematically describe jurors' exercise of capital sentencing
discretion; (2) assess the extent of arbitrariness in jurors' exercise of such discretion; and (3)
evaluate the efficacy of capital statutes in controlling such arbitrariness." Id.
153. Eisenberg et al., supra note 152, at 278. The authors focused on South Carolina because
in 2001 it was "the state with the largest share by far of the CJP's total data," and "CJP data suggest
that South Carolina jurors behave much like jurors in other states." Id. at 280.
154. See id. at 278-79.
155. Id. at 279.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. This Note has not focused on race; however, it is a significant factor in the
application of the death penalty, and it is worth noting that the study found, "Nearly two-thirds of
white jurors cast their first vote for death compared to only about one-third of black jurors. Whites
are therefore roughly twice as likely to vote for death on the first ballot as are blacks." Id at 286.
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rational prosecutors should try to empanel jurors who are white and
Southern Baptist; rational defense lawyers should try to empanel jurors
who are black and who adhere to any faith besides Southern Baptism. 16 1
In a separate 2007 study, researchers used a "mock trial scenario" to ask
similar questions about "whether religious and demo raphic factors were related
to death penalty attitudes and sentencing verdicts."1
They hypothesized "that
there are differences between those who favor the death penalty and those who
have doubts about the death penalty on religious dimensions such as affiliation,
devotionalism, fundamentalism, evangelism, and beliefs regarding God's attitude
toward criminals and punishment." This hypothesis "was generally supported"
by the findings, and that "[i]ndividual analysis indicated that those who favor the
death penalty were more likely to be males and Protestant" and were more
"likely to interpret the Bible literally or believe that God supports or requires the
death penalty for murderers." 163 The findings also supported their second
hypothesis, that "death qualification does not eliminate most group differences
observed in the full sample," 164 meaning that religious differences in the venire
carry through to the seated jury. The researchers' third hypothesis, that
"demographics and death penalty attitudes, [when combined with] religious
factors will significantly increase the amount of variance in sentencing verdict,"
was also substantiated by their findings.165 Specifically, they found that
"fundamentalism, belief in a literal interpretation of the Bible, the perception that
one's religious group favors the death penalty, and the belief that God requires
the death penalty for murderers . . . predict greater verdict preference strength in

the direction of the death penalty.",166 Their ultimate conclusion-that "a
defense attorney should eliminate potential jurors who believe in a literal
interpretation of the Bible, have fundamentalist beliefs, believe that God requires
the death penalty for murderers, and believe that their religious group supports
the death penalty" 16 7 -iS very similar to the conclusion reached in the CJP
study. 168

161. Id. at 309.
162. Monica K. Miller & R. David Hayward, Religious Characteristicsand the Death Penalty,

32 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 113, 113 (2008).
163. Id. at 115, 120.
164. Id. at 121.
165. Id. at 115, 121.
166. Id. at 121.
167. Id.
168. This is consonant with the Eisenberg, Garvey and Wells study's finding that Southern
Baptists show a propensity to vote for death on their first vote. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 152,
at 279. The Southern Baptist Convention officially supports the death penalty, SBC Resolutions,
supra note 67, and according to the Executive Committee of the Southern Baptist Convention,
South Carolina has 2,074 affiliated churches and 691,426 members as of 2009, EXEc. COMM., S.
BAPTIST CONVENTION, ANNUAL OF THE 2010 SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION 140 (2010),

available at http://sbcec.net/bor/2010/2010SBCAnnual.pdf. This is a significant percentage
(approximately 15%) of the 4,625,364 people living in South Carolina. See Paul Mackun & Steven
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In sum, these studies demonstrate a long history of using the Bible to justify
the imposition of the death penaltyl69 and why appeals to religious prejudice
continue to be made.
3.

Recent Cases Highlighting the Prominence of Religion in South
Carolina

Several fairly recent cases in South Carolina highlight the dominance of the
Christian religion in the state. In Wynne v. Town of Great Falls,170 Darla Kaye
Wynne sued the town of Great Falls in federal court, seeking an injunction to
stop the Town from praying in Jesus's name.171 After finding that the "Town
Council meetings always open with prayer," and that the "prayer frequently
refers to Jesus, Jesus Christ, Christ, or Savior in the opening or closing
portion,"1 72 the district court held that this practice violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment and permanently enjoined the Town "from
invoking the name of a specific deity associated with any one specific faith or
belief in prayers given at Town Council meetings." 7 3 Prior to filing suit,
Wynne, a practicing Wiccan, requested that the Council either change its prayers
to replace the reference to Jesus with "God" or allow others of different faiths to
offer prayers as well. 174 She was met with significant hostility. 175 The Mayor
refused Wynne's request and responded that the Council would not change such
a long-standing practice.176
Following this exchange, "several Christian
ministers drafted resolutions on behalf of their members expressing support for
continuance of a 'Christian' prayer at Council meetings." 77 Further, "numerous
citizens signed a petition urging the Council to 'not stop praying to our God in
heaven.'" 1 8 Attendance at Council meetings swelled, and Christian prayers
were even more celebrated. 17 9 Additionally, the Mayor "testified that ninetynine percent of the people in the town are Christian, and that the prayers were

Wilson, Population Distribution and Change: 2000 to 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2 tbl.1 (Mar.
2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen20l0/briefs/c2OlObr-01.pdf.
169. See generally Mark Osler, Christ, Christians and Capital Punishment, 59 BAYLOR L.
REv. 1, 30 (2007) ("[There] are some Christians who seem to center their support for capital
punishment on the words of the Old Testament. However, resting a defense of the death penalty
simply on the words of the Old Testament seems inadequate for Christians as this approach cuts out
the experiences and lessons of Christ. Nevertheless, this has long been the 'Christian' justification
for the death penalty." (footnote omitted)).
170. 376 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 2004).
171. Id at 294.
172. Id at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. See id at 294-95.
175. See id. at 295-96.
176. See id at 295.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id.
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not likely to change until someone of a different religion was elected to the
Council." 180 Despite the obviously strong ties to Christianity in the town, the
district court enjoined the official prayer, and the Fourth Circuit upheld the
decision, concluding that the Town's practice violated the Establishment Clause
because the Council sought to "advance its own religious views in preference to
all others."181
Similarly, in a 2009 case, Summers v. Adams,182 the same district court that
had decided Wynne held that South Carolina's "I Believe" Act violated the
Establishment Clause. 183 The Act authorized the creation of a license plate
containing "the words 'I Believe' and a cross superimposed on a stained glass
window."1 84 Former Lieutenant Governor Andre Bauer initiated the Act
following an unsuccessful attempt in Florida "to gain legislative approval of a
specialty plate" that promoted Christianity, the state's majority religion.185 The
district court found support for its holding in both the process by which the
license plate had been approved and in the public appeals by its proponents after
the court had issued a preliminary injunction.186 As to the approval process, the
court found that the Act "(1) authorize[d] a single plate with a uniquely Christian
message, (2) was sponsored and approved solely as the result of governmental
action, and (3) present[ed] its message in a manner . . . not available except
through the legislative approval process."
Further, the actions of government
officials following the issuance of the preliminary injunction supported the
court's conclusion that the Act was singularly aimed at promoting
Christianity.188 Interestingly, exhibiting the connections suggested earlier
between the Republican Party and the Christian Church, Lieutenant Governor
Bauer and Attorney General Henry McMaster organized two church rallies in an
attempt to drum up support for the "I Believe" Act. 189 At the first rally in Greer,
South Carolina, Lieutenant Governor Bauer referred to the variety of license
plates available in the state, suggesting "that total freedom of speech was
available through this venue to everybody[] but Christians," who he said "have
become a silent majority."1 90 At a second rally in Simpsonville, South Carolina,
Joe Mack, from the Office of Public Policy of the South Carolina Baptist
Convention, remarked that the "I Believe" Act was something the Baptists
should stand behind and commented on the influence of Baptists within the
legislature:

180. Id. at 296 n.2.
181. Id. at 302.
182. 669 F. Supp. 2d 637 (D.S.C. 2009).
183. Id. at 665; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-10510 (Supp. 2010).
184. Id. at 639 (quoting § 56-3-10510) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Id. at 640.
186. See id. at 644-46, 648-52.
187. Id. at 640.
188. See id. at 648-52.
189. Id. at 648.

190. Id. at 650 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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[W]hen I go over there and say I represent South Carolina Baptist and
our 2000 plus churches, they kind of perk up and pay attention because
they know that that's a lot of votes out there. And so we do have
influence and we want to use it in the right way .

. .

. And one of the

things we want to see good results on is the I Believe license plate; and
we're here to hear more about that tonight. 191
Lieutenant Governor Bauer echoed common rhetoric used to garner
Christian support for political purposes, stating:
Judeo Christian individuals started this country, it's what's made this
country what every other country wants to be like and why people still
want to come here for the land of hopes and dreams and promises. And
so, this is our chance to really show the public that Christians are still
here to be accounted for. . . . [Polls show that] 80 something percent of
the United States citizens consider themselves Christians. . . . We got to

stand up. We've got to make sure not only do we fight this battle, but
that we put Christians ... in every office. 192
Another speaker commented, "[Fifty] years ago, I wouldn't have to make this
statement, much less explain what the statement means. But here's the
statement. This nation was founded by Christians as a Christian nation."1 93
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the evidence of the legislative
purpose for the Act "suggest[ed] either a desire to promote Christianity or, at the
least, to acknowledge and honor Christianity as the 'majority' religion," and that
"it gives the impression that Christianity, as the ma ority religion, is also the
preferred religion and its adherents favored citizens."
These two cases are instructive because they demonstrate that many South
Carolinians view their private religious practices and their participation in civic
life as interconnected. The explicit reference to "a Christian nation" and the
implicit suggestion that, as a majority, the Christian viewpoint should guide and
direct government, is rhetoric commonly heard throughout evangelical Christian
churches in America today. 195 This misconception of the proper relationship

191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 651 n.24 (omission in original).
Id. at 652 (third omission in original) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 652 n.25 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 658, 660.

195. See GREGORY A. BOYD, THE MYTH OF A CHRISTIAN NATION 87-91 (2005). Dr. Boyd's

book is one of the most prominent books on this topic; in it, he succinctly explains an "oft-repeated"
rally cry in American evangelical churches that Christians need to "take America back for God":
The thinking is that America was founded as a Christian nation but has simply veered off
track. If we can just get the power of Caesar again, however, we can take it back. If we
can just get more Christians into office, pass more Christian laws, support more Christian
policies, we can restore this nation to its "one nation under God" status. If we can just
protect the sanctity of marriage, make it difficult, if not impossible, to live a gay lifestyle,
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between the Christian church and the government is perhaps one reason why
empirical studies show that fundamentalist Christian denominations favor the
death penalty more than others. No doubt this is a complex question, and full
treatment is beyond the scope of this Note, but members of many Christian
denominations likely could be persuaded with the following chain of logic-(1)
this is a Christian nation founded on Christian principles, and because this state
is responsible to God for just governing, it has a responsibility to punish
wrongdoers, (2) there are multiple examples where the Bible proscribes death as
a punishment for murderers, (3) therefore, not only is death an acceptable
punishment, it is probably the most just result. Accordingly, empirical evidence
showing a greater tendency of some Christian denominations to vote for death
and the continued blending of religion and politics are factors that the South
Carolina Supreme Court should take note of when evaluating religiously
prejudicial comments and considering their impact on a jury.
VI. TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS CODED APPEALS
The solicitor's improper argument in Vasquez effectively drew a sharp
contrast between the Muslim defendant and the majority of South Carolinians
who identify themselves as Christians. Not only was the defendant not a
Christian, he was an adherent to a religion that, since 9/11, arguably has been
branded a terrorist group and portrayed as the antithesis of American Christians.
While the solicitor's argument was improper, it is not typical of the religious
arguments that South Carolina courts are likely to see; exploring several
examples of the more common Judeo-Christian coded appeals is instructive.
Religious coded appeals are often woven into the penalty phase through
victim impact testimony and the State's closing arguments. For example, during

and overturn Roe vs. Wade, we will be getting closer. If we can just get prayer (Christian
prayer, of course) back into our schools along with the Ten Commandments and
creationist teaching, we will be restoring our country's Christian heritage. If we can just
keep "one nation under God" in our Pledge of Allegiance, protect the rights of Christians
to speak their minds, get more control of the liberal media, clean up the trash that's
coming out of the movie and record industry, while marginalizing, if not eradicating,
liberal groups such as the ACLU, we will have won this nation back for Jesus Christ.
Id. at 91 (footnote omitted). Dr. Boyd goes on to explain how this kind of thinking destroys the
church's ability to carry out its mission to love and serve people of every race, religion, and
gender. See id.at 93-98. In another book discussing this issue, the authors start with the premise
that
[o]ver the last several years, the Christian relation to the state has become more
dubious. The most prevalent example is the Christian language coming from the State
Department of the United States. Professing Christians have been at the helm of the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, implicitly or explicitly referencing faith in God as part of their
leadership. Patriotic pastors insist that America is a Christian nation without questioning
the places in distant and recent history where America has not looked like Christ.
SHANE CLAIBORNE & CHRIS IIAW, JESUS FOR PRESIDENT 20 (2008). From there, the authors note

their hope "to redefine what political means or looks like" and "to redefine it simply as how we
relate to the world." Id. at 21.
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the closing argument in People v. Lewis,196 the prosecutor emphasized the
location of the crime to such an extreme degree that jurors could have easily
misunderstood the location of the crime to be an aggravating factor upon which
the jury could rest its imposition of the death penalty:
These criminals violated the one safe haven we have in this troubled
world, the place where we go to enrich and glorify what is best in us,
where we reaffirm our faith in all that is good and righteous, where we
renew our souls and seek solace in the spiritual from a troubled world, a
house of God.... Who would violate the sanctity of a house of God to
commit the most heinous of crimes known to Man? . . . Only the most

vile, soulless coward could commit crimes so foul and so evil. In these
defendants we have the very epitome of evil and cowardice. These
defendants, then, are equally bereft of soul or humanity. If you spare
them ... you will sit on your hands and send the message that evil will
be tolerated in the sanctity of a house of God. 197
Although the prosecutor did not explicitly say, "You the jury should sentence
these defendants to death because they committed a murder in a church" (which
is not a legal aggravating factor in California 98), any other interpretation is hard
to defend and the impact of such an argument, particularly if used in a state
dominated by Protestant Christians, should be viewed as prejudicial.
As another example, consider the solicitor's penalty phase presentation in
State v. Mercer.199 The solicitor did not argue, "You the jury should sentence
the defendant to death because he killed one of you, a good Christian person
who was doing good Christian works in the community," but through a series
of victim impact witnesses he communicated as much. 20 0 First, the solicitor
asked about the victim's involvement in the Masons, specifically asking a
witness about one photograph in which the victim was pictured at a church "rededication." 20 1 The solicitor then asked a subsequent witness about a phone
call he had received from the victim on the day of his death.202 The witness
explained that the victim discussed his next assignment in the Army and told
him that "he wanted me to know that he had recently accepted Jesus Christ as
his Lord and Savior because he knew that was very much an integral part of
my family's life and my life." 203 In response, the solicitor immediately
followed up with questions about a picture that the victim had given to the
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140 P.3d 775 (Cal. 2006).
Id. at 842 n.27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2001).
381 S.C. 149, 672 S.E.2d 556 (2009).
See Record on Appeal at 2071-118, Mercer, 381 S.C. 149, 672 S.E.2d 556 (No. 26582).
Id. at 2072.
See id. at 2084-85.
Id. at 2085.
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witness when he left Fort Jackson. The witness described the picture as
depicting "a heavenly place setting with two hands signifying the hands of the
Lord and a place setting that goes on just seemingly without end." 20 4 Shortly
thereafter, another character witness testified about the victim's participation in
establishing a youth center, describing in detail a fund-raising coffee mug that
said "I.M.R.N.H." on one side (which meant "I'm reaching new heights"), and
"Ask me how" with a picture of the Bible on the other side.205 The witness
further described how the youth center "had tickets that they were selling
because they put on a gospel type of play that was held, and that also aided in
raising the money to open up the youth center." 206 The solicitor then
introduced the coffee cup into evidence and engaged in another lengthy
colloquy about its features, during which the witness repeatedly was prompted
to discuss the meaning behind the message on the cup. 20 7 Additionally, the
solicitor later asked this same witness about one of the participants at the
victim's memorial service program, Reverend Ogden. The witness responded:
Reverend Ogden was an instructor that worked with us. He was
also a minister, and Tracy [the victim] would-he would be guest
speakers at churches in the local community. And I remember speaking
to [Ogden], you know, one day, and he was like you know, "O.G.,
everywhere-everywhere I preach, you know, I'll be preaching and I
look up and I like, you know, look in the back and Tracy be sitting
there." And I was like, "What?" I was like, "Really?" He said, "Yeah,
you know." So Tracy would follow him pretty much everywhere he
preached.20 8
Through this series of victim impact witnesses, the solicitor cleverly wove a
theme of the victim's spiritual redemption into mitigation: (1) he was involved in
community service with the Masons, including the rededication of a church; (2)
he followed a reverend friend to multiple church services, which surprised his
close friends; (3) he was involved in starting a center to help troubled youth and
teach them about the Bible; and (4) on the day of his death, the victim called one
of his close friends to relate his own personal acceptance of Jesus Christ as his
Savior. While a non-Christian juror may not have given a second thought to this
type of recurring religious theme, its coded meaning would not have been lost on
a Christian juror.
Prosecutors also commonly present a contrast to place emphasis either on
how un-Christian the defendant is, or on how Christian the victim was. 209In
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Mercer, the solicitor placed heavy emphasis on the victim's conversion to
Christianity, specifically his specific Christian-related work. For an example of
how the characterization of a defendant as "un-Christian" can be effectively
deployed, consider the government's use of a remark that a defendant had made
to his uncle about turning his life around (which then led the uncle to write to a
judge, asking that the defendant be given a light sentence for a prior
conviction).
During the prosecutor's closing argument, he stated:
[I]n front of the Judge in Indiana, he gets his Uncle Mark, a good and
solid man, Mark Fulks. A man that truly has found God. A born-again
Christian. Took that witness stand, told you how [the defendant] Chad,
Chad comes to him and says Uncle Mark, I am following the path of the
Lord. Please write this letter. Please write this letter to the Judge so my
sentence is not so bad. Uncle Mark believes him. Uncle Mark writes
that letter, and the Judge accepts that letter that Chad Fulks, this man
that would go on to rape, and to carjack, and to kill, was a man of
God.211
Later, the government commented on the defendant's habit of showering several
times a day: "There are no amount of showers that Chad Fulks could take that
could wash his sins away. None."2 12 The clear message conveyed by these
types of comments is not simply that lying is bad, but that lying to a born-again
Christian is horrendous, and that no amount of the jury's mercy could work
redemption in the defendant's life.
Arguments such as these are common in capital cases and their potential to
incite prejudice is palpable, especially in a culture dominated by specific
religious groups that empirically show a higher propensity to vote for death.
VII. CONCLUSION

In Vasquez, the South Carolina Supreme Court added a new dimension to its
analysis of the prejudicial effects of improper comments when it credited
testimony about coded appeals and cultural conditions that gave rise to an
inference of religious prejudice in the jury's sentencing decision. The court
properly expanded the confines of its prior prejudice analysis when it found that
"religious prejudice" could exist outside of the context of an improper Biblical
reference and determined that comments merely implicating the defendant's
Muslim faith could be prejudicial, even without an explicit reference to his faith.
The constitutional limitations on religious references in closing arguments have
not deterred prosecutors from appealing to religious prejudice; many advocates

210. Fulks v. United States, No. 4:08-70072-JFA, 2010 WL 3069390, at *77-79 (D.S.C. Aug.
3, 2010).
211. Id. at *78.
212. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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have resorted to coded appeals to incite negative bias in jurors. When a
reviewing court evaluates coded appeals to determine whether they were
improper, it must necessarily examine the cultural context in which the
comments were made in order to properly understand their prejudicial impact.
Specifically, studies have found that members of some religions have a higher
propensity to vote in favor of imposing the death penalty.
While the South Carolina Supreme Court appropriately credited testimony
regarding the surrounding culture at the time the improper comments in Vasquez
were made, it remains to be seen if the court will continue to apply this
framework in the future or whether the Vasquez ruling will be treated as merely
an aberration, reflecting the unique salience of the 9/11 attacks. Ultimately,
coded appeals in capital cases are unlikely to be reined in until courts begin to
understand how cultural context drives prejudice.
David L. Paavola
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